My research focuses on the philosophical foundations of ethics, especially the possibility of an objective, universal, and naturalistic account of morality. I've developed plenty of research projects in this area. Here's a few of them:
Does Moral Realism Matter?
Many philosophers assume that common sense commits us to thinking that facts about right and wrong would exist even if we didn't believe in them, and that some moral principles are binding on all mankind. (This position is often called "moral realism.") But this might not be the case. There's good evidence that ordinary people aren't moral realists, or moral "antirealists." Yet, to a lot of people, the objectivity of morality matters. In fact, plenty of people think that without right and wrong being facts (rather than opinions), we'll have no reason not to be terrible to each other. I've been trying to evaluate this inchoate feeling by looking at the psychological evidence for the behavioral effects of metaethical attitudes. Turns out, there's good reason to think that how you view your own morality matters. In fact, it'd be better if you can be a moral realist, because seeing your own morality this way makes you more likely to stick to it when the going gets tough.
Toward a Universal Morality
Is it wrong to murder someone in every society, or just in some? If morality were universal, then some moral principles (like "murder is wrong") would apply in every society. Plenty of philosophers have tried to derive a universal morality just by reasoning alone ("a priori conceptual analysis"). But I think ethics deserves a scientific treatment, and this means we have to look at people's actual moral beliefs and judgments. So another important area of my work involves assessing the psychological accounts of moral judgment, and what these accounts imply for the universality of morality. This project especially draws on Moral Foundations Theory, a psychological research program that claims that some features of moral judgment are innately fixed (i.e. not learned), though many other features are filled in by one's culture.
When we look closely at people's actual beliefs through this lens, we find that morality is divided into two distinct spheres: moral rules that bind you to your community, and moral rules that assert your rights as an individual. Philosophers usually treat these two groups of rules as equally real (or equally non-real), but they really shouldn't. True, there's good evidence that different cultures have massive disagreements about what rules ought to bind you to your community. But there's also good evidence that there is very little disagreement about the rules that assert your basic human rights. I think we should treat these two spheres of morality differently: there is no one "right" way to bind you to a community, but we should think there are only a few correct ways to express your basic human rights. Part of morality is "just your opinion," and varies by culture. The other part is about matters of fact, and is shared universally.
Does Evolution Mean That Morality is Subjective?
So it's true, we're all just (mostly) hairless apes, and we share a common ancestor with all the other ones. Some philosophers think this means that right and wrong aren't a matter of fact, but are instead just your opinion. After all, if our moral beliefs were tracking independent facts about what's right and wrong, it seems like a really convenient coincidence that they also happened to maximize our ancestors' fitness. Surely a better explanation is that we believe what's right and wrong based on what benefited us as a species, and not what really is right and wrong. (And that therefore, maybe there is no objective right and wrong).
This line of thought has some serious appeal, but I think it's incorrect. The main reason is that arguments like this overgeneralize. Sure, evolution has had a massive influence on our beliefs. But if we thought that a belief being advantageous gave us a reason to doubt it, we would have reason to doubt just about every belief we have. After all, evolutionary influences absolutely permeated all the judgments our ancestors made, not just their moral judgments. The real problem that evolution introduces isn't this influence, but the possibility that morality might be an entirely natural phenomenon. Some people think that means right and wrong can't be objective. But we actually have good reasons to think that morality can be both natural and objective at the same time.
Can Morality be Natural?
Many philosophers think that right and wrong aren't natural features of the world. Instead, they're something we add to the world (with our judgments), or something that somehow transcends the natural world. I don't think that's correct. There are a few reasons philosophers think right and wrong can't be natural, but they largely rely on an approach to theoretical knowledge that is itself suspect. In general, philosophers who doubt that morality is natural will point to a feature that morality appears to have, point out that this feature is incompatible with morality's being natural, and then conclude that morality can't therefore be natural. But this is going about studying morality in all the wrong ways. We can't figure out what is definitive of morality through conceptual analysis; we've got to study it as a function of human beings' actual communities, relationships, and judgments. When we do that, it turns out there is a phenomenon in the natural world that closely matches what we might have thought morality was about all along.
These are just a few of my projects; I'm always working on something new. If you're interested in any of these ideas and want to discuss them with me, feel free to email me!
Does Moral Realism Matter?
Many philosophers assume that common sense commits us to thinking that facts about right and wrong would exist even if we didn't believe in them, and that some moral principles are binding on all mankind. (This position is often called "moral realism.") But this might not be the case. There's good evidence that ordinary people aren't moral realists, or moral "antirealists." Yet, to a lot of people, the objectivity of morality matters. In fact, plenty of people think that without right and wrong being facts (rather than opinions), we'll have no reason not to be terrible to each other. I've been trying to evaluate this inchoate feeling by looking at the psychological evidence for the behavioral effects of metaethical attitudes. Turns out, there's good reason to think that how you view your own morality matters. In fact, it'd be better if you can be a moral realist, because seeing your own morality this way makes you more likely to stick to it when the going gets tough.
Toward a Universal Morality
Is it wrong to murder someone in every society, or just in some? If morality were universal, then some moral principles (like "murder is wrong") would apply in every society. Plenty of philosophers have tried to derive a universal morality just by reasoning alone ("a priori conceptual analysis"). But I think ethics deserves a scientific treatment, and this means we have to look at people's actual moral beliefs and judgments. So another important area of my work involves assessing the psychological accounts of moral judgment, and what these accounts imply for the universality of morality. This project especially draws on Moral Foundations Theory, a psychological research program that claims that some features of moral judgment are innately fixed (i.e. not learned), though many other features are filled in by one's culture.
When we look closely at people's actual beliefs through this lens, we find that morality is divided into two distinct spheres: moral rules that bind you to your community, and moral rules that assert your rights as an individual. Philosophers usually treat these two groups of rules as equally real (or equally non-real), but they really shouldn't. True, there's good evidence that different cultures have massive disagreements about what rules ought to bind you to your community. But there's also good evidence that there is very little disagreement about the rules that assert your basic human rights. I think we should treat these two spheres of morality differently: there is no one "right" way to bind you to a community, but we should think there are only a few correct ways to express your basic human rights. Part of morality is "just your opinion," and varies by culture. The other part is about matters of fact, and is shared universally.
Does Evolution Mean That Morality is Subjective?
So it's true, we're all just (mostly) hairless apes, and we share a common ancestor with all the other ones. Some philosophers think this means that right and wrong aren't a matter of fact, but are instead just your opinion. After all, if our moral beliefs were tracking independent facts about what's right and wrong, it seems like a really convenient coincidence that they also happened to maximize our ancestors' fitness. Surely a better explanation is that we believe what's right and wrong based on what benefited us as a species, and not what really is right and wrong. (And that therefore, maybe there is no objective right and wrong).
This line of thought has some serious appeal, but I think it's incorrect. The main reason is that arguments like this overgeneralize. Sure, evolution has had a massive influence on our beliefs. But if we thought that a belief being advantageous gave us a reason to doubt it, we would have reason to doubt just about every belief we have. After all, evolutionary influences absolutely permeated all the judgments our ancestors made, not just their moral judgments. The real problem that evolution introduces isn't this influence, but the possibility that morality might be an entirely natural phenomenon. Some people think that means right and wrong can't be objective. But we actually have good reasons to think that morality can be both natural and objective at the same time.
Can Morality be Natural?
Many philosophers think that right and wrong aren't natural features of the world. Instead, they're something we add to the world (with our judgments), or something that somehow transcends the natural world. I don't think that's correct. There are a few reasons philosophers think right and wrong can't be natural, but they largely rely on an approach to theoretical knowledge that is itself suspect. In general, philosophers who doubt that morality is natural will point to a feature that morality appears to have, point out that this feature is incompatible with morality's being natural, and then conclude that morality can't therefore be natural. But this is going about studying morality in all the wrong ways. We can't figure out what is definitive of morality through conceptual analysis; we've got to study it as a function of human beings' actual communities, relationships, and judgments. When we do that, it turns out there is a phenomenon in the natural world that closely matches what we might have thought morality was about all along.
These are just a few of my projects; I'm always working on something new. If you're interested in any of these ideas and want to discuss them with me, feel free to email me!